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NRP  : 4212 101 003 
Department : Marine Engineering 
Supervisor I : Ir. Alam Baheramsyah, M.Sc. 
Supervisor II : Dr. Dhimas Widhi Handani, S.T., M.Sc. 
 
ABSTRACT 
LPG Plant is a very important plant in the LPG supply 
chain, it reliability must be good to avoid any loss, even a small 
accident could create huge effect in a supply chain. To reduce 
any hazard possibility, some methods could be used. Hazard 
and Operability (HAZOP) is a proper method to be used to 
analyze any hazard probability, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and 
Layer of Protection (LOPA) shall be used too to analyze the 
failure rate and the mitigation if the risk level is in medium or 
higher level. All LPG loading system should be analyzed to 
guarantee that the system would not cause small or big 
accident. An LPG loading system is a system that load propane 
and butane from the carrier vessel to the tank in the LPG plant. 
The system that have been analyzed then must be categorized 
based on it risk level, a low or moderate risk level shall not be 
mitigated while a medium or higher risk level shall be 
mitigated, the risk level itself was based on the risk matrix, this 
risk matrix had it definition to determine the probability and 
severity level, when the severity and probability number was 
combined, a risk level could be determined, which means risk 
level is a combination of severity and probability of a system 
or sub-system. The mitigation process shall reduce the risk 
xii 
 
level of the LPG loading process. It shall make the plant 
become even more safe than the plant before the mitigation, but 
even the assessment result was there is no medium or higher 
level risk, the remaining risk shall be considered too to decrease 
the risk level to the lowest level, especially for a system which 
did not have any safeguard. The result of the assessment is all 
of the LPG plant is only on moderate or lower risk level, which 
means it did not need any mitigation. 
 
Keywords: lpg plant, mitigation, risk, risk assessment, risk 
level. 
  
xiii 
 
ANALISA POTENSI BAHAYA PADA PROSES 
BONGKAR LPG DI TERMINAL LPG SEMARANG 
 
Nama   : Bawono Rizki Putra 
NRP   : 4212 101 003 
Jurusan  : Marine Engineering 
Dosen Pembimbing I : Ir. Alam Baheramsyah, M.Sc. 
Dosen Pembimbing II : Dr. Dhimas Widhi, S.T., M.Sc. 
 
ABSTRAK 
Fasilitas LPG merupakan sebuah fasilitas yang sangat 
penting dalam rantai distribusi LPG, keandalannya haruslah 
bagus untuk menghindari kerugian, bahkan sebuah insiden 
kecil dapat menimbulkan dampak yang besar pada rantai 
distribusi LPG. Untuk mengurangi kemungkinan bahaya, 
beberapa metode dapat digunakan. Hazard and Operabulity 
(HAZOP) merupakan metode yang sesuai untuk menganalisis 
kemungkinan terjadinya bahaya, selain itu Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), dan Layer of Protection (LOPA) juga dapat digunakan 
untuk menganalisa rasio kegagalan sebuah system dan langkah 
mitigasinya.apabila tingkat risikonya berada pada tingkat 
menegah ataupun lebih tinggi. Seluruh proses bongkar LPG 
harus dianalisis untuk memastikan bahwa sistem tersebut tidak 
akan menimbulkan insiden. Sebuah sistem bongkar LPG 
adalah sistem yang membawa muatan berupa Propana dan 
Butana dari kapal pengangkut ke tangki penyimpanan di 
fasilitas. Sistem yang sudah dianalisis kemudian akan 
dikategorikan dalam beberapa tingkat risiko, yang mana risiko 
level rendah tidak harus ditindak lanjuti, sedangkan risiko 
dengan level menengah atau lebih tinggi harus dimitigasi, 
tingkatan risiko itu sendiri berdasarkan pada matriks risiko, 
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sebuah matriks risiko memiliki definisinya sendiri untuk 
menentukan tingkat kemungkinan maupun keparahannya, 
ketika angka kemungkinan dan keparahan digabungkan, maka 
tingkat risiko dapat ditentukan, yang mana hal tersebut berarti 
bahwa tingkatan risiko merupakan hasil gabungan dari angka 
keparahan dan kemungkinan gagal dari sebuah system atau 
sub-sistem. Proses mitigasi akan mengurangi tingkat risiko 
pada proses bongkar LPG. Hal ini akan membuat proses 
bongkar LPG lebih baik daripada sebelum mitigasi dilakukan, 
walaupun hasil dari analisa menunjukkan bahwa tidak ada 
risiko tingkat menengah atau level tinggi, risiko tingkat di 
bawahnya harus tetap diperhatikan juga, bila perlu diturunkan 
lagi risikonya hingga ke tingkatan paling rendah., terutama 
untuk system yang belum memiliki alat keselamatan. Hasilnya 
adalah seluruh sistem pada fasilitas LPG hanya berada pada 
tingkat bahaya kecil, yang berarti tidak butuh tindak lanjut.  
 
Kata kunci: analisa risiko, fasilitas lpg, mitigasi, risiko, 
tingkat risiko. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Manpower is one of the most important aspect in 
production process in a company. So manpower must be 
protected from any risk which can be caused by environment 
or the work itself. Labor Minister Regulation number: PER.05/ 
MEN/ 1996, Chapter III, Article 3 state that: “Every company 
which have manpower equal or more than a hundred and have 
risk potency which can be caused by process characteristic or 
production material which can causing accident, such as 
explosion, fire, contamination, and illness, must implementing 
HSE Management System.” 
To ensure the HSE (Health, Safety, Environment) 
management system works well, every company have their 
own HSE Department. The HSE Department of some 
companies are responsible for environmental protection, 
occupational health and safety at work. HSE management has 
two general objectives: prevention of incidents or accidents that 
might result from abnormal operating conditions on the one 
hand and reduction of adverse effects that result from normal 
operating conditions on the other hand. 
For example, fire, explosion and release of harmful 
substances into the environment or the work area must be 
prevented. Also action must be taken to reduce a company’s 
environmental impact under normal operating conditions (like 
reducing the company’s carbon footprint) and to prevent 
workers from developing work related diseases. Regulatory 
requirements play an important role in both approaches and 
consequently, HSE managers must identify and understand 
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relevant HSE regulations, the implications of which must be 
communicated to top management (the board of directors) so 
the company can implement suitable measures. 
HSE management is already been implemented in 
many company in Indonesia. And the needs of good HSE 
management always increasing because of high accident 
number in Indonesia. BPJS Ketenagakerjaan, the insurance 
company of Indonesia’s Government, claims that every year 
more than 10 thousand accidents occurred in Indonesia, that 
number always increasing every year. 
Table 1. Accident Number in Indonesia 
 
Accident number in workplace increasing about 
1,76% every year. There are 103.285 accident occurred in 
2013, or 283 accidents every day, with average 7 persons dead, 
18 persons got physical disability, and the rest can completely 
recover. 
Generally, the success rate of HSE program 
implementation is determined by the number of occurred 
incident. The more accident occurred, the worst HSE 
implementation is. The table above show that HSE 
implementation in Indonesia is still bad and need to be 
improved. To have good HSE implementation, a sustainable 
HSE implementation program is needed, and must be 
integrated in all of company area, support from every worker 
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in the company is also needed. Therefore, to measure the 
success rate of the HSE implementation, the process which 
have been done must be considered, because evaluating the 
implementation process is a very important to ensure that the 
program has been implemented by every worker. Thus, 
accident in workplace can be prevented from the beginning, not 
only be decreased or eliminated. 
A workplace risk assessment is one of the key tools 
for improving occupational safety and health conditions at 
work. Thus it plays an important role in protecting workers and 
businesses, as well as complying with the laws in many 
countries. It helps everyone focus on the risks that really matter 
in the workplace – the ones with the potential to cause real 
harm. In many instances, straightforward measures can readily 
control risks, for example providing drinking water to prevent 
dehydration, window blinds to reduce temperature gain in 
buildings, ensuring spillages are cleaned up promptly so people 
do not slip, or cupboard drawers are kept closed to ensure 
people do not trip. For most, that means simple, cheap and 
effective measures to ensure workers, businesses most valuable 
asset, are protected. 
A well conducted workplace risk assessment will 
contribute to the protection of workers by eliminating or 
minimizing work related hazards and risks. It should also 
benefit businesses through better organization of working 
practices potentially increasing productivity. A risk assessment 
is simply a careful examination of what, in the workplace, 
could cause harm to people. It enables a weighing up of 
whether enough precautions are in place or whether more 
should be done to prevent harm to those at risk, including 
workers and members of the public. 
Accidents and ill health can ruin lives as well as 
affecting businesses, for example if output is lost, machinery is 
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damaged, insurance costs increase or other financial penalties. 
In many countries employers are legally required to assess the 
risks in their workplace so that they can put in place a plan to 
control these risks. 
The concept of a workplace risk assessment is that it 
is a continual, ongoing process – like a film on a loop. Not a 
snapshot of a workplace, which can be likened to a workplace 
inspection. Whilst it may be beneficial to use information from 
workplace inspections when undertaking risk assessments, we 
must be clear on the difference between risk assessments and 
inspections. A risk assessment should identify the hazard and 
the required control measure, an inspection should verify if the 
required control measures are in fact being used. 
Safety is also a very important aspect in loading-
unloading process of LPG. Loading-unloading of LPG in the 
special wharf have a very important role in fuel and LPG 
distribution in Central Java or nearby area. Any failure, 
accident, or mistake in this process will give bad effect in LPG 
distribution. 
Loading and unloading process is closely related to 
risk and accident. Failure and accident is a loss which must be 
controlled and avoided if all factors which related to the 
accident can be predicted as early as possible. Safety 
assessment study aims to find any weakness of a system which 
could causing an accident. 
An accident could be caused by some factors, such as 
failure in loading-unloading equipment, loading-unloading 
procedure, safety procedure, human error probability, or even 
environment factor. And must also be considered that loading-
unloading of LPG have big risk on safety, because of fire and 
explosion possibility, and it can even cause pollution to the 
environment. 
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On 4 January 1966, an accident occurred in LPG 
Tank in France, about 81 peoples dead and 130 people injured. 
On 19 November 1984 a major fire and a series of catastrophic 
explosions occurred at the government owned and operated 
PEMEX LPG Terminal at San Juan Ixhuatepec, Mexico City. 
As a consequence of these events some 500 individuals were 
killed and the terminal destroyed. 
Some other minor accident also occurred in LPG 
terminal, even though the accident did not give big impact to 
the environment or to the worker, the accident still delayed the 
loading – unloading process of LPG, these are some accidents 
that occurred in Terminal LPG Surabaya along 21st century 
(Maryono, 2002): 
 Fallen worker at MLA control ladder 
 Leakage on cargo hose 
 Fallen outboard arm and injuring the ship crew 
 And some other system failures 
Even tough accident in LPG Terminal is a rare case, 
but the severity will cause a very dangerous impact to the 
worker, or to the environment. To prevent any bad impact, a 
hazard potency analysis should be done to reveal all potency 
hazard that may occurred, and prevent the hazard to happen. 
Beside, LPG consumption always increase every 
year, the LPG consumption will be shown below. 
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Figure 1. LPG Consumption Every Year 
 
The increase of LPG consumption will give effect on 
the increases of LPG import or production, which will increase 
the needs of LPG terminal, it could be the increase of LPG 
terminal number or the increase of the existing LPG terminal 
capacity. The hazard potency analysis in Tanjung Mas LPG 
Terminal can give input to another LPG terminal or new LPG 
terminal to control the hazard in the terminal, because the 
system of every LPG terminal is similar. 
 
1.2 Statement Of Problems 
To ensure the research can work well, some problem 
that can appear while the research is on progress must be 
known, those are: 
1. What are the hazard that may happen in the LNG 
loading-unloading system? 
2. What kind of required mitigation to decrease the risk 
in the system? 
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1.3 Research Limitation 
Some limitations of problem which must be used are: 
1. The thesis object is limited inside the area of CPO 
Tanjung Mas Semarang 
2. The thesis is focused on safety aspect on equipment 
in LPG loading process. 
 
1.4 Research Benefit 
The benefit of this research is: 
4. Any risk probability can be revealed even before an 
accident happen 
4. Mitigation plan can be made to avoid the risk. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE STUDY 
 
 
2.1 Theory 
4.1.1. Indonesia Act 
Indonesia government has made some act to ensure 
the workers safety, one of the act is UU No. 1 year 1970 about 
Safety in Work, which made by the Ministry of Employment, 
Directorate of HSE Norm Development, that legitimated on 12 
January 1970. There are 15 article in the act, those are: 
 Article 1 about the terms 
 Article 2 about the scope 
 Article 3 about the requirement of safety at work 
 Article 5, 6, 7 about the supervision 
 Article 9 about the development 
 Article 10 about the development committee of 
health and safety at work 
 Article 11 about accident 
 Article 12 about the obligation and right of the 
workers 
 Article 13 about the obligation when entering the 
work place 
 Article 14 about the obligation of the management 
 Article 15, 17, 18 about the closing. 
4.1.2. OSHA 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), 
a federal law that became effective on April 28, 1971, is 
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intended to pull together all federal and state occupational 
safety and health enforcement efforts under a federal program 
designed to establish uniform codes, standards, and 
regulations. The expressed purpose of the act is: “To assure, as 
far as possible, every working woman and man in the Nation 
safe and healthful working conditions, and to preserve our 
human resources.” To accomplish this purpose, the 
promulgation and enforcement of safety and health standards is 
provided for, as well as research, information, education, and 
training in occupational safety and health. 
One of the greatest sources of criticism of OSHA in 
the past has been its more than 5000 consensus standard. These 
include many so-called Mickey Mouse rules that burden 
employers without really protecting worker standards that bear 
no relationship to employee safety. 
Another complaint concerns OSHA’s inspection 
program. More than 100.000 inspections are conducted each 
year (DeReamer, 1980), but far too many of them have been 
performed in light hazard establishments and in organizations 
with good to outstanding safety records, rather than in 
establishments with significant safety and health problem and 
poor records. 
Late in 1977 the Secretary of Labor and the Assistant 
Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health 
announced a redirection of OSHA priorities that would 
concentrate agency resources on serous health and safety 
problems. The agency goals included the following: 
 Direct 95% of OSHA inspections to those industries 
with the most serious health problems, such as 
construction, manufacturing, transportation, and the 
petrochemical industries, as the part of an all-out 
combat occupational illness and disease. Some small 
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businesses, such as auto repair, building materials, and 
dry cleaning, would also receive more frequent 
inspections 
 Provide more cooperation and assistance to small 
business. Small business engaged in low-risk activities 
would be inspected less often. Educational and 
consultative services would be expanded to help the 
small businessman voluntarily comply with the law. 
Additionally, OSHA exempted the nation’s 3,4 million 
small businesses with 10 or fewer employees from all 
record keeping requirement 
 Eliminated unnecessary safety regulations and revise 
and simplify necessary regulations that are 
complicated or unclear 
When the OSH Act became operative in April 1971, 
employees, labor organizations, business, and industry for the 
first time encountered large scale federal participation in 
occupational safety and health activity. Thousands of safety 
and health standards were promulgated, compliance officers 
were selected and trained, OSHA inspection priorities were 
established, a new reporting system for occupational injuries 
and illnesses, which differs widely from the Old American 
National Standard method, was instituted, and labor and 
management got underway an intensive educational efforts 
concerning employee rights and management responsibility 
under the act. 
No one yet knows the effect of the OSH Act has had 
on the nation’s work injury experience (because the reporting 
system was changed there is no adequate comparable data to 
compare the situations before and after the act). There is no 
doubt, however, that the act has given ever widening visibility 
to the whole realm of occupational safety and health. It has 
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given new status and responsibility to the safety and health 
practitioners. The OSH Act has encouraged greater training of 
the practitioners in occupational safety and health. New 
curricula and university programs leading to degrees in safety 
and health have been inaugurated, and more are yet to come. 
The existence of the OSH Act has aroused many employers and 
labor unions to a heightened concern for safety and health 
problems and for compliance with OSH Act regulations. 
The OSH Act and OSHA are not without limitations, 
although that is all for the good. The administration has been 
slow in adopting health standards, although this area is 
recognized as being the most critical by all sides. In a six-year 
period (1971 – 1977) just 17 health standards were adopted. 
Even if it were able to achieve a breakthrough in health 
standards development by a magnitude of 10 times the current 
level, it would take some 50 years to cover the 1500 suspect 
carcinogens identified by NIOSH. And the standards that have 
been issued are lengthy. As an example, the standard on coke-
oven emissions ran some 50 pages in the Federal Register. If 
this trend in continued, the OSHA is headed toward a 100.000-
page Federal Register for health standards alone. 
For the most part, OSHA safety and health standards 
cover only those regulations that are enforceable-namely, 
control over physical conditions and environment. Important 
elements of a balanced safety program, such as supervisory 
safety training, system safety analysis, and human factors 
engineering, safety program elements have not generally been 
included in the OSHA standard. But in addition to those 
shortcomings, several OSHA standards are irrelevant, 
defective, and bear no relation to employee safety. 
The Occupational Health and Safety Administration 
has revoked 928 of these irrelevant standards, but his should 
and must be only the beginning. Federal safety and health 
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standards must be based on known causes of injuries and illness 
so that compliance therewith will produce significant 
reductions in injuries, illnesses, or associated risks. 
This must be kept in sharp focus mere compliance 
with the requirements of the OSH Act will not achieve 
optimum safety and health in terms of accident and illness 
prevention and the well-being of employees. For the most part, 
the occupational safety and health standards constitute minimal 
criteria and represent a floor rather than a goal to achieve. 
Effective accident prevention and control of occupational 
health must go beyond the OSH Act. Achieving the purpose of 
the act,”to assure, as far as possible, every working woman and 
man in the nation safe and healthful working conditions.” Will 
depend on the willingness and cooperation of all concerned 
employees, employers, labor organizations, institutions, and 
government. 
4.1.3. Hazard Definition 
There are some definitions about hazard. One of 
those is hazard involve risk and probability, which related to 
the unknown elements. (Asfahl, 1999) 
Hazard as the potential condition to cause injury to 
the personnel, damage to the tools or another company asset. 
When a hazard is occurred, then the probability of those bad 
effects will show up. (DeReamer, 1980) 
Primary hazard is a hazard which can directly causing 
dead; damage on the tools, structure, facility; degradation of 
functional capability; material losses. These are some hazard 
category: 
• Physical hazard 
Noise, radiation, lighting, heat 
• Chemical hazard 
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Dangerous material, chemical steam 
• Biology hazard 
Virus, fungi 
• Mechanical hazard 
Tools, machinery 
• Ergonomics hazard 
Confined space, material lifting 
• Psychosocial hazard 
Work-shift pattern, long work time 
• Behavior hazard 
Less on skill, not follow the standard 
• Environment hazard 
Bad lighting, weather, fire. 
4.1.4. LPG Loading Process 
Based on (Maryono, 2002) LPG loading – 
unloading process is divided into 3 steps, those are: 
a) Mooring: 
 The ship is pushed slowly by tug boat 
 Mooring process is aided by mooring boat 
 After the ship is completely moored, check all the 
mooring connection, ensure the ship is tightly 
moored. 
b) Loading/ unloading: 
LPG loading/ unloading process usually use Marine 
Loading Arm (MLA) to load/ unload the gas from/ to the port. 
The loading/ unloading process is divided into 3 part: 
connecting, loading/ unloading, and discharging. 
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Figure 2. Loading Process 
 
 Connecting: 
o Install the bounding cable 
o Ensure all clear 
o Push the electricity panel on 
o Turn the MLA on 
o Turn the hydraulic pump on 
o Open the selector valve on MLA. 
 Loading/ unloading: 
o Ensure all valve are open 
o Start the pump 
o Check the discharging pipe pressure during the 
pumping process 
o Close the gate valve in MLA, port, tank, and the 
ship. 
 Releasing: 
o Ensure the arm is clear 
o Release the bounding cable with the ship 
manifold 
o Release the outboard arm from the tanker 
manifold 
o Put MLA on non-operating state 
o Lock the inboard arm 
o Close the selector valve 
o Shut the pump and electricity panel off. 
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c) Ship release: 
 Release the mooring from the port and buoy 
 Tug boat will help the ship leaving the port 
4.1.5. Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) 
A hazard operability study (HAZOP) is a systematic, 
critical examination by a team of engineering and operating 
intentions of a process to assess the hazard potential of mal-
operation or mal-function of individual items of equipment and 
the consequential effects on the facility as a whole. (IEC, 2001) 
It is quite normal to carry out safety reviews. These 
may take different forms. Experts may be consulted in 
isolation, without reference to each other. They may instead be 
gathered in lengthy meetings to discuss the particular topic. 
HAZOP are meetings with a distinct structure, the structure 
imposing a certain organization, to enhance effectiveness. They 
are a generalized study technique, equally applicable to 
microchip manufacture, pharmaceutical synthesis, effluent 
plant operation or any process. 
They should not be seen, however, as a solution to all 
ills, the ultimate review. The procedure is only anther tool in 
the safety locker and should be seen as complementary to other 
techniques. Indeed, it is best applied as one stage of a multi-
stage procedure, applying different techniques as relevant to 
each stage. It does not replace, but rather supplements, existing 
Codes of Practice. Neither can it totally substitute for 
experience. But, both Codes of Practice and experience are 
evolved from existing situations. Innovative developments 
require a review which investigates the unknown. HAZOPs are 
a systematic, logical approach to determining problems. 
The basis of HAZOP is a “guide word examination” 
which is a deliberate search for deviations from the design 
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intent. To facilitate the examination, a system is divided into 
parts in such a way that the design intent for each part can be 
adequately defined. The size of the part chosen is likely to 
depend on the complexity of the system and the severity of the 
hazard. In complex systems or those which present a high 
hazard the parts are likely to be small. In simple systems or 
those which present low hazards, the use of larger parts will 
expedite the study. The design intent for a given part of a 
system is expressed in terms of elements which convey the 
essential features of the part and which represent natural 
divisions of the part. The selection of elements to be examined 
is to some extent a subjective decision in that there may be 
several combinations which will achieve the required purpose 
and the choice may also depend upon the particular application. 
Elements may be discrete steps or stages in a procedure, 
individual signals and equipment items in a control system, 
equipment or components in a process or electronic system, etc. 
In some case it may be helpful to express the function 
of a part in terms of: 
 the input material taken from a source; 
 an activity which is performed on that material; 
 a product which is taken to a destination. 
Thus the design intent will contain the following 
elements: materials, activities, sources and destinations which 
can be viewed as elements of the part. 
Elements can often be usefully defined further in 
terms of characteristics which can be either quantitative or 
qualitative. For example, in a chemical system, the element 
“material” may be defined further in terms of characteristics 
such as temperature, pressure and composition. For the activity 
“transport”, characteristics such as the rate of movement or the 
18 
 
number of passengers may be relevant. For computer-based 
systems, information rather than material is likely to be the 
subject of each part. 
The HAZOP team examines each element (and 
characteristic, where relevant) for deviation from the design 
intent which can lead to undesirable consequences. The 
identification of deviations from the design intent is achieved 
by a questioning process using predetermined “guide words”. 
The role of the guide word is to stimulate imaginative thinking, 
to focus the study and elicit ideas and discussion, thereby 
maximizing the chances of study completeness. The guide 
word which used in HAZOP process will be shown in the table 
below (based on BS IEC 61882 2001). 
Table 2. HAZOP Guide Word 
Guide Word Meaning 
NO or NOT Complete negations of the 
design intent 
MORE Quantitative increase 
LESS Quantitative decrease 
AS WELL ASS Qualitative modification/ 
increase 
PART OF Qualitative modification/ 
decrease 
REVERSE Logical opposite of the 
design intent 
OTHER THAN Complete substitution 
 
Additional guide words relating to clock time and 
order or sequence are given in the next table. 
Table 3. Additional Guideword 
Guide Word Meaning 
EARLY Relative to the clock time 
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LATE Relative to the clock time 
BEFORE Relating to order or 
sequence 
AFTER Relating to order or 
sequence 
 
There are a number of interpretations of the above 
guide words. Additional guide words may be used to facilitate 
identification of deviation. Such guide words may be used 
provided they are identified before the examination 
commences. Having selected a part for examination, the design 
intent of that part is broken into separate elements. Each 
relevant guide word is then applied to each element, thus a 
thorough search for deviations is carried out in a systematic 
manner. Having applied a guide word, possible causes and 
consequences of a given deviation is examined and 
mechanisms for detection or indication of failures may also be 
investigated. The results of the examination are recorded to an 
agreed format. 
Guide word/element associations may be regarded as 
a matrix, with the guide words defining the rows and the 
elements defining the columns. Within each cell of the matrix 
thus formed will be a specific guide word/element 
combination. To achieve a comprehensive hazard 
identification, it is necessary that the elements and their 
associated characteristics cover all relevant aspects of the 
design intent and guide words cover all deviations. Not all 
combinations will give credible deviations, so the matrix may 
have several empty spaces when all guide word/element 
combinations are considered. There are two possible sequences 
in which the cells of the matrix can be examined, namely 
column by column, i.e. element first, or row by row, i.e. guide 
word first. 
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To make a HAZOP analysis, the process that must be 
done are: 
 
Figure 3. HAZOP Process 
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Based on BS IEC 61882 2001, the HAZOP 
table standard is shown in figure below. 
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Table 4. HAZOP Sheet 
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 Design Intent  
The design intent is a description of how the process 
is expected to behave at the node; this is qualitatively described 
as an activity (e.g., feed, reaction, sedimentation) and/or 
quantitatively in the process parameters, like temperature, flow 
rate, pressure, composition, etc.  
 Deviation  
A deviation is a way in which the process conditions 
may depart from their design/process intent. 
 Parameter  
The relevant parameter for the condition(s) of the 
process (e.g. pressure, temperature, composition). 
 Guideword  
A short word to create the imagination of a deviation 
of the design/process intent. The most commonly used set of 
guide-words is: no, more, less, as well as, part of, other than, 
and reverse. In addition, guidewords like too early, too late, 
instead of, are used; the latter mainly for batch-like processes. 
The guidewords are applied, in turn, to all the parameters, in 
order to identify unexpected and yet credible deviations from 
the design/process intent.  
 Cause  
The reason(s) why the deviation could occur. Several 
causes may be identified for one deviation. It is often 
recommended to start with the causes that may result in the 
worst possible consequence. 38  
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 Consequence  
The results of the deviation, in case it occurs. 
Consequences may both comprise process hazards and 
operability problems, like plant shut-down or reduced quality 
of the product. Several consequences may follow from one 
cause and, in turn, one consequence can have several causes  
 Safeguard  
Facilities that help to reduce the occurrence 
frequency of the deviation or to mitigate its consequences. 
There are, in principle, five types of safeguards that:  
1. Identify the deviation (e.g., detectors and alarms, 
and human operator detection)  
2. Compensate for the deviation (e.g., an automatic 
control system that reduces the feed to a vessel in case of 
overfilling it. These are usually an integrated part of the process 
control)  
3. Prevent the deviation from occurring (e.g., an inert 
gas blanket in storages of flammable substances)  
4. Prevent further escalation of the deviation (e.g., by 
(total) trip of the activity. These facilities are often interlocked 
with several units in the process, often controlled by 
computers)  
5. Relieve the process from the hazardous deviation 
(e.g., pressure safety valves (PSV) and vent systems)  
4.1.6. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a top down, deductive 
failure analysis in which an undesired state of a system is 
analyzed using Boolean logic to combine a series of lower-
level events. This analysis method is mainly used in the fields 
of safety engineering and reliability engineering to understand 
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how systems can fail, to identify the best ways to reduce risk or 
to determine (or get a feeling for) event rates of a safety 
accident or a particular system level (functional) failure. FTA 
is used in the aerospace, nuclear power, chemical and process, 
pharmaceutical, petrochemical and other high-hazard 
industries; but is also used in fields as diverse as risk factor 
identification relating to social service system failure. FTA is 
also used in software engineering for debugging purposes and 
is closely related to cause-elimination technique used to detect 
bugs. 
FTA needs to be carried out because of: 
 To exhaustively identify the causes of a failure 
 To identify weaknesses in a system 
 To assess a proposed design for its reliability or 
safety 
 To identify effects of human errors 
 To prioritize contributors to failure 
 To identify effective upgrades to a system 
 To quantify the failure probability and contributors 
 To optimize tests and maintenances (Vesely, 2006) 
The tree structure is deemed sufficient to demonstrate 
the ways in which events arise. A list of recommendations is 
also developed for managing risks. The main elements most 
commonly used to construct a fault tree are (Mullai, 2006): 
 The top event is the one that is analyzed, which is 
represented by a rectangle; 
 Intermediate events are system states or occurrences 
that contribute to the accident, which are represented 
by rectangles; 
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 Basic events are the lowest levels of resolution in the 
fault tree, which are represented by circles; 
 Undeveloped events are those that are not further 
developed in the fault tree, which are represented by 
diamonds; 
 “AND” gates - the output event associated with this 
gate exists only if all of the input events exist 
simultaneously; 
 “OR” gates - the output event associated with this gate 
exists if at least one of the input events exists. 
 
Figure 4. FTA Tree 
 
OR Gate, either of two independent element failures 
produces system failure.  
RT = RARB 
PF = 1 – RT 
PF = 1 – (RARB) 
PF = 1- [(1-PA) (1-PB)]  
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PF = PA + PB - PAPB 
 
P + R = 1  
R = e-𝜆T  
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
 
Notes: 
R: Reliability  
P: Failure Probability  
𝜆: Failure Rate  
T: Exposure Interval 
 
Figure 5. Propagation Through OR Gate 
 
AND Gate, both of two independent elements must 
fail to produce system failure.  
RT = RA + RB - RARB 
PF = 1 – RT 
PF = 1 – (RA + RB - RARB) 
PF = 1- [(1-PA) + (1-PB) - (1-PA) (1-PB)]  
PF = PAPB 
 
P + R = 1  
R = e-𝜆T  
P = 1- e-𝜆T 
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Notes: 
R: Reliability  
P: Failure Probability  
𝜆: Failure Rate  
T: Exposure Interval 
4.1.7. Risk Evaluation 
The risk evaluation is represented by the achievement 
of a synthetic level of risk, which is the “magnitude of a risk or 
combination of risks, expressed in terms of the combination of 
consequences and their likelihood”. This level of risk should be 
compared with risk criteria for determining if the risk is 
acceptable or tolerable. Evaluating risks is important for 
determining priorities for the implementation of risk control 
measures. The risk rating is a combination of the frequency (F) 
and the likelihood of the incident occurring and the severity of 
the possible consequences (C). (ISO (International 
Organization for Standardization), 2009) 
On evaluate risk, there is a point which must know to 
determine criteria for the risk. This is will be a reference to 
know the criteria of the risk, tolerable, intolerable or ALARP 
(As Low as Reasonably Practicable). There for it will be need 
a standard as a reference to determine their criteria, some 
standard well most known are DNV-GL, NASA, US Coast 
Guard, US Department of Defense, UK HSE, IMO, etc. There 
are also several standards which made by company for their 
risk evaluation. 
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Table 5. 5x5 Risk Measurement Matrix 
 
Peter Bernstein, in his book Against the Gods: The 
Remarkable Story of Risk, wrote about the importance of the 
development of risk. He said: ‘The revolutionary idea that 
defines the boundary between modern times and the past is the 
mastery of risk: the notion that the future is more than a whim 
of the gods and that men and women are not passive before 
nature. Until human beings discovered a way across that 
boundary, the future was a mirror of the past or the murky 
domain of oracles and soothsayers.’ (IRCA, n.d.) 
The description from the 5x5 risk matrix is: 
Table 6. Severity Description 
Rank Severity Description 
1 Trivial Minor injury/ no internal disruption 
2 Minor Injury which requires medical attention/ 
minor internal disruption. 
3 Lost Time Potentially life threatening injury causing 
temporary disability and/or requiring 
medevac/ disruption possibly requiring 
corrective action. 
4 Major Major life threatening injury or causing 
permanent disability/ incomplete 
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recovery/ pollution with significant 
impact/ very serious disruption which 
may cause performance degraded. 
5 Fatal Fatality or multiple fatalities or multiple 
life threatening injuries causing 
permanent disabilities/ total loss. 
 
 
Table 7. Probability Description 
Rank Description Probability 
1 Very Unlikely: Could only occur 
under a freak combination of factors 
< 10−5 
 
2 Unlikely: May occur only in 
exceptional circumstances. 
10−5 − 10−4 
3 Possible: Could occur at some 
time.  
10−4 − 10−2 
4 Likely: Would not require 
extraordinary factors to occur at some 
time. 
10−2 − 10−1 
5 Frequent: Almost certain to happen if 
conditions remain unchanged. 
10−2 −  1 
 
 
Where:  
1-2: Low risk area, the potential hazards are under control.  
3-8:  Moderate risk area, there is the need to verify that the 
potential hazards are under control and improve the measures 
already adopted.  
9-15:  Medium risk area, there is the need to identify and 
schedule protection and prevention measures to be adopted in 
order to reduce or the probability P or the potential damage S.  
16-25:  High risk area, there is the need to identify and 
schedule protection and prevention measures to be adopted in 
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order to reduce the probability of the potential hazard (they 
shall be considered as urgent). 
4.1.8. Mitigation 
If the analyzed risk has medium or high risk 
probability, then the risk must be mitigated to decrease the 
number. Mitigation process which be used in this thesis is using 
LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis). 
LOPA was introduced in the 1990s, and has recently 
gained international popularity. LOPA is referred to in 
literature as both a simplified risk assessment technique and a 
risk analysis tool. Capital improvement planning, incident 
investigation, and management of change can be found as 
additional applications. LOPA is a flexible tool which can be 
used in different contexts and applications making it confusing 
to understand what it really is. The application under 
consideration is LOPA as a SIL determination tool. 
According to Marszal and Scharpf (2002) LOPA can 
be viewed as a special type of event tree analysis (ETA), which 
has the purpose of determining the frequency of an unwanted 
consequence, that can be prevented by a set of protection 
layers. The approach evaluates a worst-case scenario, where all 
the protection layers must fail in order for the consequence to 
occur. The frequency of the unwanted consequence is 
calculated by multiplying the PFDs of the protection layers 
with the demand on the protection system (represented as a 
frequency). Comparing the resulting frequency of the 
unwanted consequence with a tolerable risk frequency, 
identifies the necessary risk reduction and an appropriate SIL 
can be selected (Marszal and Scharpf, 2002; CCPS, 2001). 
The LOPA worksheet can be seen in the figure below. 
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Table 8. LOPA Worksheet 
 
 
2.2 Previous Research 
Similar research has been done by a student of Marine 
Engineering, FTK-ITS. The research is done by Bayu Maryono 
in around 2001. While the title is “Studi Evaluasi Teknik 
Keselamatan pada Proses Pembongkaran Muatan di Dermaga 
Khusus Gospier Pertamina UPMS V Surabaya.” 
This research and the research which done by Bayu 
Maryono have similarity, both research focused on safety 
aspect in loading-unloading process of LPG. The difference is 
the research which done by Bayu Maryono is held in Terminal 
LPG Surabaya, while this research will be held in Terminal 
LPG Semarang, which may have several difference in the 
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system and work procedure. The other difference is the method, 
the Bayu Maryono’s research used FMEA, FTA, and Task 
Analysis to assess the safety in loading-unloading process. 
While this research will use FMEA to assess the system, and 
JSA to assess the work procedure
34 
 
“This page is intentionally left blank”
35  
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 
 To solve the mentioned problem in the first page, some process will be used. 
4. Background  Before conducting the research, first will be explained the background of this study.   4. Literature Study  The study of literature is an early stage is the stage of learning about the basic theories to be discussed or used in the thesis. Source taken at this stage comes from books, papers, websites, journals, and so forth.   4. Data collection. This phase is to obtain information about the ships that use gas fuel and learn the workings of their systems.   4. Identify Function, Requirements and Specification Identify and understand the process steps and their functions, requirements, and specifications that are within the scope of the analysis. The goal in this phase is to clarify the design intent or purpose of the process. This step leads quite naturally to the identification of potential failure modes.   4. Risk Identification (HAZOP)  Potential cause of failure describes how a process failure could occur, in terms of something that can be 
36  
controlled or corrected. The goal is to describe the direct relationship that exists between the cause and resulting process failure mode.   4. Frequency Analysis Analysis of the data in order to determine the levels of risk. By using FTA for frequency analysis.  4. Risk Evaluation This stage will be determined whether the risks are acceptable or not, the decisions are made based on Risk Matrix.  4. Mitigation  If there are any intolerable risk after the risk evaluation, then will be do a mitigation act to minimize those risk by using LOPA method.   4.  Conclusions and Recommendations  Make conclusions based on the results obtained and suggestions for further research development. 
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 CHAPTER 4 DATA ANALYSIS 
  
4.1 Data Analysis 
LPG Liquid loading process is a process to flow the LPG liquid from the vessel to the facility tanker, this process is using a system named Liquid Loading System. The system is also can flow back the vapour from the tank to the ship, this process is used for refrigerated type vessel. 
1. Liquid Loading 
Liquid loading is piping system which been used to transfer the LPG from the ship to the storage tank   
 
Figure 6. Liquid Loading System  
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2. Vapor Return 
Vapor return is used when the ship type is refrigerated type.  
  
 
Figure 7. Vapor Return System  
Notes 
HV : Hand Valve 
CV : Check Valve 
TI : Temperature Indicator 
PI : Pressure Indicator 
TT : Temperature Transducer 
PT : Pressure Transducer 
SDV : Shut Down Valve 
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Each part in the system have different function, but the main function of the parts is to ensure the safety of the system. 
1. Hand valve 
This is a manual valve that mostly are positioned as normally open. To open or close this valve, operator must open it manually and could not be opened from the control room. 
Notes: 
HV : Hand Valve 
CV : Check Valve 
TI : Temperature Indicator 
PI : Pressure Indicator 
TT : Temperature Transducer 
PT : Pressure Transducer 
SDV : Shut Down Valve 
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Figure 8. Hand Valve  
2. Check Valve 
The function is to ensure the fluids flows to only one direction, this valve is located when there is an upstream pipeline. 
 
Figure 9. Check Valve 3. Temperature Indicator 
This part will show the temperature of the fluids inside the pipeline, temperature indicator must be monitored manually from the field. 
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Figure 10. Temperature Indicator  
4. Temperature Transducer 
This part is similar with the temperature indicator and have same function, but this transducer can be monitored from the control room. 
 
Figure 11. Temperature Transducer    
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5. Pressure Indicator 
This part will show the pressure of the liquid inside the pipe. 
 
Figure 12. Pressure Indicator   
6. Pressure Transducer 
This part is similar with the previous part, but it can be monitored from the control room, same as Temperature Transducer. 
 
Figure 13. Pressure Transducer  
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7. Shut Down Valve 
This valve will shut down when an emergency situation occurred, so that the liquid will not pass through to the next pipeline and broke more parts. 
 
Figure 14. Shut Down Valve   
4.2 Risk Assessment 
A risk assessment can be done by doing three main steps, those are: 
 Risk identification, which will identify any risk that may occur in a system  Risk analysis, which will analyze the risk that have been identify in the previous process  Risk evaluation, which will evaluate the whole analysis and decide the risk is acceptable or not. 
In this sub chapter, the process that will be used as example is Ship LPG Liquid Unloading based on the P&ID of the LPG Loading System. The complete assessment is attached in the Attachment. 
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4.2.1. Risk Identification 
The risk identification can be done by doing HAZOP process, the identification must follow the HAZOP standard, including the Guide Word, Element, and the Deviation. The first thing is to determine the guide word that will be used, e.g.: No, More, Less, etc. The next step is to determine the Element which will be used, this element can be chosen from many things, for example Flow to identify the liquid pressure, or temperature to identify the liquid temperature. The combination of Guide Word and Element will be a Deviation. These are the deviation which used in the Ship LPG Liquid Loading: 
Table 9. The Deviation and It Meaning Guide Word Element Deviation Meaning No Flow No Flow The liquid could not pass through a certain section of the pipeline More Flow More Flow The liquid that pass through a certain part of the pipeline have higher pressure than the normal pressure Less Flow Less Flow The liquid that pass through a certain part of the pipeline have lower pressure than the normal pressure Reverse Flow Reverse Flow The liquid that pass through a 
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certain part of the pipeline will not only flow in a direction Less Temperature Less Temperature The liquid that pass through a certain part of the pipeline have lower temperature than the normal temperature More Temperature More Temperature The liquid that pass through a certain part of the pipeline have higher temperature than the normal temperature  Each deviation has some possible causes or only one possible causes. The possible cause must be identified carefully to ensure that anything that may happen are completely identified. The possible causes may be a small cause that not too important or have very little possibility to happen or may be a big cause with very high possibility to happen, even a small cause must be identified. Mostly, a No Flow deviation is caused by a closed valve that actually must be opened during the process. This deviation can also be caused by a leakage that occurred in the pipeline. A Less Flow deviation usually caused by inproper opened valve or small leakage. The opposite deviation, More Flow can be caused by too high pressure from the vessel pump. 
48  
While Reverse Flow deviation can happen in a branching pipe which become one line, because when the liquid from the branch pipe pass through the one-line pipe, there is a chance that the liquid will go through opposite direction of the flow, passing through the main pipe. A Less Temperature and More Temperature deviation mostly be caused by heat exchanger faulty from the vessel. After the possible causes is identified, then the consequences must be identified too. The consequences is any event that may happen when a failure occurred. A consequence which identified must be carefully wrote, even a small consequence until a big consequence can become a huge incident. Each possible cause can create one or more consequences, for example a heat exchanger control failure can create two consequences, such as icing on the pipeline and too low liquid temperature. The next step is to identify the available safeguard in the system, if there are no safeguard available, then the proper safeguard must be written in the recommendation. Every possible cause may have some safeguard according it place, for example to identify the temperature and prevent icing on the pipeline, some Temperature Indicator are placed in the system, there are also some Temperature Transducer that have same function as Temperature Indicator but have more advantage, a Temperature Transducer can be monitored from the control room, while a Temperature Indicator could not, but a Temperature Indicator can be a good comparison data to the Temperature Transducer, in case there 
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are some automatic measurement mistake (not well calibrated).
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4.2.2. Risk Analysis 
After finished on risk identification step for all system, the next step is risk analysis to determine level of frequency and consequence which will be used as an input for the risk evaluation. For the example will be shown the risk analysis result from HAZOP of LPG Transfer Process from the vessel to the tank. Frequency value for each causes are decided from FTA method which had explained before. The value of Basic Event is obtained from OREDA 2002. After obtained the value of Failure Rates and Probability of Failure, the value will be matched to Risk Matrix Table. The FTA method will start from top event which refer to Possible Causes from HAZOP worksheet. For each causes will be given a code to simplify the process.  A1 LPT 1.1 The mentioned code above means: A : First level contributor 1 : First contributor LPT : Stands for LPG Transfer 1 : Failure mode’s number, based on HAZOP worksheet 1 : Potential cause order   
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 The used codes above are: 
A1 = Delayed operation  
A2 = Failed to open on demand 
A3 = Spurious operation   The value of each event are decided based on the gate type. Failure Probability for Basic Event will be acquired from Failure Rates Value.   
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 A1 LPT 1.1 ܲ = 1 − ݁ିఒ்  ߣ = 0,3 × 10ି଺ ܶ = 9,325  
஺ܲଵ =  1 − ݁ି൫଴,ଷ×ଵ଴షల൯×ଽ,ଷଶହ 
஺ܲଵ = 2,797 × 10ି଺                  A2 LPT 1.1 ܲ = 1 − ݁ିఒ்  ߣ = 5,850 × 10ି଺ ܶ = 9,325  
஺ܲଶ =  1 − ݁ି൫ହ.଼ହ଴×ଵ଴షల൯×ଽ,ଷଶହ 
஺ܲଶ = 5,455 × 10ି଺          
 A3 LPT 1.1 ܲ = 1 − ݁ିఒ்  ߣ = 1,360 × 10ି଺ ܶ = 9,325  
஺ܲଷ =  1 − ݁ି൫ଵ,ଷ଺଴×ଵ଴షల൯×ଽ,ଷଶହ 
஺ܲଷ = 1,268 × 10ି଺         
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 ௅ܲ௉்ଵ.ଵ = ஺ܲଵ + ஺ܲଶ + ஺ܲଷ − ஺ܲଵ஺ଶ − ஺ܲଵ஺ଷ − ஺ܲଶ஺ଷ +
஺ܲଵ஺ଶ஺ଷ 
௅ܲ௉்ଵ.ଵ = (2,797 × 10ି଺) + (5,455 × 10ି଺)+ (1,268 × 10ି଺)− (2,797 × 10ି଺)(5,455 × 10ି଺)− (2,797 × 10ି଺)(1,268 × 10ି଺)− (5,455 × 10ି଺)(1,268 × 10ି଺)+ (2,797 × 10ି଺)(5,455× 10ି଺)( 1,268 × 10ି଺) ࡼࡸࡼࢀ૚.૚ = ૠ, ૙૙૜ × ૚૙ି૞ 
The other FTA result for the first node (LPT 1.1) will be shown below. 
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 Notes: B1 = Breakdown B2 = Fail to start on demand B3 = Faulty output voltage B4 = Low output A1 = Loss power B5 = Delayed operation B6 = Failed to open on demand B7 = Spurious operation A2 = Fail to control valve 
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Notes: B1 = Breakdown B2 = Fail to start on demand B3 = Faulty output voltage B4 = Low output A1 = Power loss B5 = Delayed operation B6 = Failed to open on demand B7 = Spurious operation A2 = Fail to control valve   
61  
 
  Note:   A1 = External leakage  
4.2.3. Risk Evaluation 
As the example before, the risk evaluation will use A1 LPT 1.1 as the example, the other calculation will be shown in the table and the rest calculation will be attached. 
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A1 LPT 1 is the number 1 Deviation, that is No Flow. While 1.1 means the number 1 deviation with it first possible cause, that is One or more manual valves are inadvertently closed. The calculation before showed that the probability of the cause is 7ݔ10ିହ. 
Table 10. Probability Level of A1 LPT 1.1 Rank Description Probability 1 Very Unlikely: Could only occur under a freak combination of factors < 10ିହ  2 Unlikely: May occur only in exceptional circumstances. 10ିହ − 10ିସ 3 Possible: Could occur at some time.  10ିସ − 10ିଶ 4 Likely: Would not require extraordinary factors to occur at some time. 10ିଶ − 10ିଵ 5 Frequent: Almost certain to happen if conditions remain unchanged. 10ିଶ −  1  From the table, can be know that the probability of the cause can be grouped in the second group, that is Unlikely to be happen. 
Table 11. A1 LPT 1.1 Severity Level Rank Severity Description 1 Trivial Minor injury/ no internal disruption 2 Minor Injury which requires medical attention/ minor internal disruption. 3 Lost Time Potentially life threatening injury causing temporary disability and/or requiring medevac/ disruption possibly requiring corrective action. 4 Major Major life threatening injury or causing permanent disability/ incomplete recovery/ pollution with significant 
63  
impact/ very serious disruption which may cause performance degraded. 5 Fatal Fatality or multiple fatalities or multiple life threatening injuries causing permanent disabilities/ total loss.  While the severity can be defined from the possible cause and grouped based on the table above. Then can be found that the cause can be grouped in the second group, that is Minor injury.  
Table 12. A1 LPT 1.1 Risk Matrix  
  From the table above, can be known that the risk level is 4. 
Table 13. Risk Category Where:  1-2: Low risk area, the potential hazards are under control.  3-8:  Moderate risk area, there is the need to verify that the potential hazards are under control and improve the measures already adopted.  
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9-15:  Medium risk area, there is the need to identify and schedule protection and prevention measures to be adopted in order to reduce or the probability P or the potential damage S.  16-25:  High risk area, there is the need to identify and schedule protection and prevention measures to be adopted in order to reduce the probability of the potential hazard (they shall be considered as urgent).  The risk matrix result shown that A1 LPT 1.1 have 4 in number for the risk level. The number 4 is categorized as Moderate Risk Area, which is no correction is required for the cause.
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4.3 Mitigation 
The risk that need to be analyzed in the Mitigation process is the risk which have Medium Risk or above. In this bachelor thesis, there is no part that have Medium risk and there is no risk that can be categorized above Medium. 
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81  
Notes:  A1 = Delayed operation A2 = Failed to open on demand A3 = Spurious operation  
A1 LPT 1.1      
        
P = 2,797,E-06   l = 3,000,E-07 
     T = 9,325,E+0 
        
A2 LPT 1.1      
        
P = 5,455,E-05   l = 5,850,E-06 
     T = 9,325,E+0 
        
A3 LPT 1.1      
        
P = 1,268,E-05   l = 1,360,E-06 
     T = 9,325,E+0 
        LPT 1.1       
        
P = 7,003,E-05      
   
82  
 
83  
  Notes:  B1 = Breakdown B2 = Fail to start on demand B3 = Faulty output voltage B4 = Low output A1 = Loss power B5 = Delayed operation B6 = Failed to open on demand B7 = Spurious operation A2 = Fail to control valve   
84  
 B1 LPT 1.2      
        
P = 3,066,E-06   l = 1,320,E-05 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
B2 LPT 1.2      
        
P = 1,891,E-03   l = 8,141,E-03 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
B3 LPT 1.2      
        
P = 7,637,E-05   l = 3,288,E-04 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
B4 LPT 1.2      
        
P = 3,067,E-05   l = 1,320,E-04 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
A1 LPT 1.2      
        
P = 2,001,E-03          
85  
  
B5 LPT 1.2              
P = 1,999,E-06   l = 3,600,E-06      T = 5,554,E-01         B6 LPT 1.2              
P = 9,997,E-07   l = 1,800,E-06      T = 5,554,E-01         B7 LPT 1.2              
P = 7,641,E-05   l = 1,981,E-05 
     T = 3,857,E+00         A2 LPT 1.2              P = 7,941,E-05                      LPT 1.2               
P = 2,081,E-03      
   
86  
 
87  
 Notes:  B1 = Breakdown B2 = Fail to start on demand B3 = Faulty output voltage B4 = Low output A1 = Power loss B5 = Delayed operation B6 = Failed to open on demand B7 = Spurious operation A2 = Fail to control valve   
88  
 B1 LPT 1.3      
        
P = 3,066,E-06   l = 1,320,E-05 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
B2 LPT 1.3      
        
P = 1,891,E-03   l = 8,141,E-03 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
B3 LPT 1.3      
        
P = 7,637,E-05   l = 3,288,E-04 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
B4 LPT 1.3      
        
P = 3,067,E-05   l = 1,320,E-04 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
A1 LPT 1.3      
        
P = 2,001,E-03          
89  
 B5 LPT 1.3      
        
P = 1,999,E-06   l = 3,600,E-06 
     T = 5,554,E-01 
        
B6 LPT 1.3      
        
P = 9,997,E-07   l = 1,800,E-06 
     T = 5,554,E-01 
        
B7 LPT 1.3      
        
P = 7,641,E-05   l = 1,981,E-05 
     T = 3,857,E+00 
        
A2 LPT 1.3      
        
P = 7,941,E-05              
        LPT 1.3       
        
P = 2,081,E-03         
90  
 
 Notes:  A1 = External leakage 
 A1 LPT 1.4      
        
P = 9,512,E-07   l = 6,100,E-07 
     T = 1,559,E+00 
        LPT 1.4       
        
P = 9,512,E-07       
91  
  Notes :  A1 = External leakage  
92  
 A1 LPT 2.1      
        
P = 9,512,E-07   l = 6,100,E-07 
     T = 1,559,E+00 
        LPT 2.1       
        
P = 9,512,E-07          
93  
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Notes:  A1 = Delayed operation A2 = Failed to open on demand A3 = Spurious operation  
 A1 LPT 2.2      
        
P = 2,797,E-06   l = 3,000,E-07 
     T = 9,325,E+00 
        
A2 LPT 2.2      
        
P = 3,226,E-05   l = 3,460,E-06 
     T = 9,325,E+00 
        
A3 LPT 2.2      
        
P = 1,268,E-05   l = 1,360,E-06 
     T = 9,325,E+00 
        LPT 2.2       
        
P = 4,774,E-05          
95  
n  
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 Notes:  B1 = Breakdown B2 = Fail to start on demand B3 = Spurious stop B4 = Vibration A1 = Pump failure B5 = External leakage B6 = Delayed operation   
97  
 B1 LPT 3.1      
        
P = 9,348,E-07   l = 7,180,E-06 
     T = 1,302,E-01 
        
B2 LPT 3.1      
        
P = 9,348,E-07   l = 7,180,E-06 
     T = 1,302,E-01 
        
B3 LPT 3.1      
        
P = 1,896,E-06   l = 1,456,E-05 
     T = 1,302,E-01 
        
B4 LPT 3.1      
        
P = 9,348,E-07   l = 7,180,E-06 
     T = 1,302,E-01 
        
A1 LPT 3.1      
        
P = 4,700,E-06          
98  
 B5 LPT 3.1      
        
P = 1,000,E-06   l = 1,124,E-05 
     T = 8,900,E-02 
        
B6 LPT 3.1      
        
P = 1,000,E-06   l = 1,124,E-05 
     T = 8,900,E-02 
        
A2 LPT 3.1      
        
P = 2,001,E-06              LPT 3.1       
        
P = 6,701,E-06         
99  
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 Notes:  B1 = Insufficient heat transfer B2 = Abnormal in instrument reading A1 = Heater failure B3 = Fail to function on demand B4 = Spurious operation A2 = Incompatible temperature   
101  
 B1 LPT 5.1      
        
P = 3,001,E-06   l = 6,654,E-05 
     T = 4,510,E-02 
        
B2 LPT 5.1      
        
P = 3,001,E-06   l = 6,654,E-05 
     T = 4,510,E-02 
        
A1 LPT 5.1      
        
P = 6,002,E-06          
102  
 B3 LPT 5.1      
        
P = 4,672,E-06   l = 3,100,E-06 
     T = 1,507,E+00 
        
B4 LPT 5.1      
        
P = 4,672,E-06   l = 3,100,E-06 
     T = 1,507,E+00 
        
A2 LPT 5.1      
        
P = 9,343,E-06              LPT 5.1       
        P = 1,535,E-05         
103  
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Notes:  B1 = Fail to function on demand B2 = Spurious operation A1 = Measurement failure 
 B1 LPT 5.2      
        
P = 4,672,E-06   l = 3,100,E-06 
     T = 1,507,E+00 
        
B2 LPT 5.2      
        
P = 4,672,E-06   l = 3,100,E-06 
     T = 1,507,E+00 
        LPT 5.2       
        
P = 9,343,E-06         
105  
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Notes:  B1 = Abnormal in instrument reading B2 = Overheating B3 = Parameter deviation B4 = Structural deficiency 
 B1 LPT 6.1      
        
P = 3,070,E-06   l = 1,357,E-05 
     T = 2,262,E-01 
        
B2 LPT 6.1      
        
P = 9,772,E-07   l = 4,320,E-06 
     T = 2,262,E-01 
        
B3 LPT 6.1      
        
P = 4,047,E-06   l = 7,140,E-06 
     T = 2,262,E-01 
        
B4 LPT 6.1      
        
P = 3,149,E-06   l = 1,392,E-05 
     T = 2,262,E-01 LPT 6.1       
P = 1,124,E-05        
107  
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Notes:  B1 = Fail to function on demand B2 = Spuriouos operation A1 = Measurement failure 
 B1 LPT 6.2      
        
P = 4,672,E-06   l = 3,100,E-06 
     T = 1,507,E+00 
        
B2 LPT 6.2      
        
P = 4,672,E-06   l = 3,100,E-06 
     T = 1,507,E+00 
        
A1 LPT 6.2      
        
P = 9,343,E-06         
109  
FTA CHART: NODE 2 
   
110  
Notes:  A1 = Delayed operation A2 = Failed to open on demand A3 = Spurious operation  
A1 VPT 1.1      
        
P = 1,333,E-06   l = 2,100,E-07 
     T = 6,347,E+00 
        
A2 VPT 1.1      
        
P = 2,526,E-05   l = 3,980,E-06 
     T = 6,347,E+00 
        
A3 VPT 1.1      
        
P = 5,141,E-06   l = 8,100,E-07 
     T = 6,347,E+00 
        
VPT 1.1      
        
P = 3,174,E-05      
   
111  
 
112  
 Notes:  B1 = Breakdown B2 = Fail to start on demand B3 = Faulty output voltage B4 = Low output A1 = Loss power B5 = Delayed operation B6 = Failed to open on demand B7 = Spurious operation A2 = Failure on valve   
113  
 B1 VPT 1.2      
        
P = 3,066,E-06   l = 1,320,E-05 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
B2 VPT 1.2      
        
P = 1,891,E-03   l = 8,141,E-03 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
B3 VPT 1.2      
        
P = 7,637,E-05   l = 3,288,E-04 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
B4 VPT 1.2      
        
P = 3,067,E-05   l = 1,320,E-04 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
A1 VPT 1.2      
        
P = 2,001,E-03          
114  
 B5 VPT 1.2      
        
P = 1,999,E-06   l = 3,600,E-06 
     T = 5,554,E-01 
        
B6 VPT 1.2      
        
P = 9,997,E-07   l = 1,800,E-06 
     T = 5,554,E-01 
        
B7 VPT 1.2      
        
P = 7,641,E-05   l = 1,981,E-05 
     T = 3,857,E+00 
        
A2 VPT 1.2      
        
P = 7,941,E-05              
        
VPT 1.2      
        
P = 2,081,E-03          
115  
 
116  
 Notes:  B1 = Breakdown B2 = Fail to start on demand B3 = Faulty output voltage B4 = Low output A1 = Loss power B5 = Delayed operation B6 = Failed to open on demand B7 = Spurious operation A2 = Failure on valve   
117  
 B1 VPT 1.3      
        
P = 3,066,E-06   l = 1,320,E-05 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
B2 VPT 1.3      
        
P = 1,891,E-03   l = 8,141,E-03 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
B3 VPT 1.3      
        
P = 7,637,E-05   l = 3,288,E-04 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
B4 VPT 1.3      
        
P = 3,067,E-05   l = 1,320,E-04 
     T = 2,323,E-01 
        
A1 VPT 1.3      
        
P = 2,001,E-03         
118  
 B5 VPT 1.3      
        
P = 1,999,E-06   l = 3,600,E-06 
     T = 5,554,E-01 
        
B6 VPT 1.3      
        
P = 9,997,E-07   l = 1,800,E-06 
     T = 5,554,E-01 
        
B7 VPT 1.3      
        
P = 7,641,E-05   l = 1,981,E-05 
     T = 3,857,E+00 
        
A2 VPT 1.3      
        
P = 7,941,E-05              
        
VPT 1.3      
        
P = 2,081,E-03          
119  
 Notes:  A1 = External leakage  
 A1 VPT 1.4      
        
P = 1,879,E-05   l = 2,960,E-06 
     T = 6,347,E+00 
        
VPT 1.4      
        
P = 1,879,E-05         
120  
 Notes :  A1 = External leakage  
 A1 VPT 2.1      
        
P = 1,879,E-05   l = 2,960,E-06 
     T = 6,347,E+00 
        
VPT 2.1      
        
P = 1,879,E-05         
121  
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Notes:  A1 = Delayed operation A2 = Failed to open on demand A3 = Spurious operation  
 A1 VPT 2.2      
        
P = 1,333,E-06   l = 2,100,E-07 
     T = 6,347,E+00 
        
A2 VPT 2.2      
        
P = 2,526,E-05   l = 3,980,E-06 
     T = 6,347,E+00 
        
A3 VPT 2.2      
        
P = 5,141,E-06   l = 8,100,E-07 
     T = 6,347,E+00 
        
VPT 2.2      
        
P = 3,174,E-05         
123  
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Notes:  B1 = Insufficient heat transfer B2 = Abnormal in instrument reading A1 = Heater failure B3 = Fail to function on demand B4 = Spurious operation A2 = Incompatible temperature  
 B1 VPT 5.1      
        
P = 3,001,E-06   l = 6,654,E-05 
     T = 4,510,E-02 
        
B2 VPT 5.1      
        
P = 3,001,E-06   l = 6,654,E-05 
     T = 4,510,E-02 
        
A1 VPT 5.1      
        
P = 6,002,E-06          
125  
 B3 VPT 5.1      
        
P = 4,672,E-06   l = 3,100,E-06 
     T = 1,507,E+00 
        
B4 VPT 5.1      
        
P = 4,672,E-06   l = 3,100,E-06 
     T = 1,507,E+00 
        
A2 VPT 5.1      
        
P = 9,343,E-06              
VPT 5.1      
        
P = 1,535,E-05         
126  
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Notes:  A1 = Fail to function on demand A2 = Spuriouos operation 
 A1 VPT 5.2      
        
P = 4,672,E-06   l = 3,100,E-06 
     T = 1,507,E+00 
        
A2 VPT 5.2      
        
P = 4,672,E-06   l = 3,100,E-06 
     T = 1,507,E+00 
        
VPT 5.2      
        
P = 9,343,E-06         
128  
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Notes:  B1 = Abnormal in instrument reading B2 = Overheating B3 = Parameter deviation B4 = Structural deficiency 
B1 VPT 6.1      
        
P = 3,070,E-06   l = 1,357,E-05 
     T = 2,262,E-01 
        
B2 VPT 6.1      
        
P = 9,772,E-07   l = 4,320,E-06 
     T = 2,262,E-01 
        
B3 VPT 6.1      
        
P = 4,047,E-06   l = 7,140,E-06 
     T = 2,262,E-01 
        
B4 VPT 6.1      
        
P = 3,149,E-06   l = 1,392,E-05 
     T = 2,262,E-01 
        
VPT 6.1      
        
P = 1,124,E-05      
  
130  
   
131  
Notes:  B1 = Fail to function on demand B2 = Spuriouos operation A1 = Measurement failure 
 B1 VPT 6.2      
        
P = 4,672,E-06   l = 3,100,E-06 
     T = 1,507,E+00 
        
B2 VPT 6.2      
        
P = 4,672,E-06   l = 3,100,E-06 
     T = 1,507,E+00 
        
A1 VPT 6.2      
        
P = 9,343,E-06          
132  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
A LPG facility must have very low risk to avoid any 
damage, because a hazard can give big impact to the 
environment, human, or even from the LPG supply chain. 
Based on the risk assessment, could be concluded that: 
1. All of the LPG loading process and Vapor Return 
process have low or moderate risk level 
2. The lowest risk level is One or more manual valve 
inadvertently closed, which only have Low (2) risk 
level 
3. The highest risk level is only on Moderate risk level 
4. No high risk level means that the LPG Plant is a well-
planned plant, which have been proven by until now 
the plant is still in Zero Accident status 
5. Zero accident does not mean that it is impossible any 
accident will happen in the plant, so the mitigated 
process must be implemented to reduce the risk level. 
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